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LED Theory Of Material Objects
Michael Longenecker
1. Views on the Persistence of Material Objects
In this paper I present a new theory of the nature and composition of material
objects. Material objects are thought to persist over time and survive various
changes. For example, in 2005, the tree in my front lawn (named ‘Titan’) was just a
sapling. In 2010, Titan had grown 5
5-feet tall. By 2015, it is now 10-feet
feet tall.
Now there are competing views about how Titan persists through time. On
what is considered the ‘commonsense’ view, Titan persists by being ‘wholly present’
at each time at which it exists. Call this Endu
Endurantism.

On a popular alternate view known as ‘Worm Theory’ Titan persists by
having a different temporal part at each time (See for example Heller 325-327).
325
The
idea is that just as Titan is spread out across space, so it is spread out across time—
time
by having
aving parts. Here we have the parts named as ‘ α’, ‘β’ and ‘γ’’ to represent the fact
that they are distinct objects. None
one of these objects are identical to Titan, but they
are all parts of it. So where Endurantism has only one thing—Titan—Worm
Worm Theory
has it that there are more things than we might initially think
think.This
This is called ‘Worm
Theory’ since objects look like worms spread out across time.
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The view that I defend here is distinct from both views since it treats
trea Titan as
having non-concrete parts. A non
non-concrete
concrete object is an object that lacks many of the
features that concrete objects typically have
have—size,
size, shape, mass, location, causal
abilities, etc.—but
but yet is unlike typical abstract objects since a non
non-concre
concrete object
could have those features.
Timothy Williamson has recently argued for such objects. He argues that it is
impossible for something not to exist. For example, in any world in which the
proposition <Socrates does not exist> is true, it must refer tto Socrates.
tes. But if it refers
to Socrates, then Socrates exists in that world. Hence, it couldn’t be that Socrates
does not exist (Williamson 233)
233).. Nevertheless, it’s clear that Socrates could have
never been born. In that case, Socrates would exist, but wo
wouldn’t
uldn’t be a concrete thing.
He wouldn’t have size, shape, mass, causal abilities, etc. (Williamson 246).
Here I am borrowing this ontology to present a new view. On this view, Titan
has α, β and γ as parts at each time at which it exists. Whatever parts it has, it has
essentially—it
it can never change with respect to what parts it has. But what differs
between times is which part is concrete. This view is similar to Endurantism since it
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doesn’t treat Titan as being spread out across time. But it is also similar to Worm
Theory since at each time, a different part of it is concrete.

I call this the ‘LED theory’ since material objects resemble L
LED
ED display
boards. Just as a board is composed of numerous lights, each of which can be on or
off, so
o objects are composed of numerous parts, each of which can be concrete or
non-concrete. To make the analogy tighter, we should imagine that the following is
also true of the display board: each light can only be on for exactly one moment. No
light can be on for more than a moment, nor can it tturn
urn on again at a later moment.

2. Argument for LED Theory
Why think LED theory is better than its competitors? The reason is that it is the only
view that can preserve a particular compelling principle concerning thee nature of
parthood.
Let me begin by elucidating the notion of parthood that I have here. I take it
to be the familiar notion that we work with when we say things like ‘the seat,
seat back,
legs and armrests are part of the chair’, and ‘the bits of wood are part of the seat’. I
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will talk specifically in terms of what is known as proper parthood. This notion of
parthood is irreflexive—an object is not a part of itself. So the chair is not a part of
itself, nor the seat a part of itself. The relation is asymmetric—if a is part of b, then b
is not part of a. Thus the chair is not part of the seat since the seat is part of the
chair. It is also transitive—if a is part of b, and b is part of c, then a is part of c. Since
the seat is part of the chair, and the bits of wood are part of the seat, the bits of wood
are part of the seat.
We should also notice that its coherent to think that objects can partially
overlap. In other words, it’s possible that a and b are not identical, but share a part.
For example, two chairs can overlap or share a part by sharing an armrest—think of
theater seats. But what is clearly not possible is that two objects completely overlap.
It’s not possible for a and b to be not identical yet share all the same parts. So if we
have Chair A and Chair B and every object that is a part of one is a also a part of the
other. Then the names ‘Chair A’ and ‘Chair B’ must refer to the same chair. I take this
to be an eminently plausible principle. To deny this principle seems plainly absurd.
Material objects are the type of thing that ‘crowd out’ other objects (see, for
example, David Lewis 252).

2.1 Against Endurantism
But the problem for Endurantism is that there are cases that it is forced to interpret
as being counter-examples to the principle. Consider the following simple scenario
of David and Clump:
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at t1, a statue-maker purchases a piece of clay named ‘Clump’. At t2, he shapes it into
a statue and names the newly created statue ‘David’. In this scenario, Clump clearly
continues to exist at t2. Though pieces of clay don’t survive being burnt to a pile of
ash, or being chopped into a thousand smaller pieces, they can surely survive
various changes in their shape
shape. So both Clump and David exist at t2. They also share
all the same parts at t2 since every bit of clay or molecule that is part of one is also
part of the other. Given
iven No Complete Overlap, they must be identical. But the
problem is that
hat they are not identical since Clump existed on Monday, but David did
not.
Worm Theory and the LED Theory have a leg up on Endurantism since they
can avoid this problem. Worm Theor
Theory
y implies that David and Clump have temporal
parts for each time at which they exist. And since David had not yet been created at
t1, Clump has a t1 temporal part
part—namely κ—that David lacks.
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The LED Theory also claims an advantage over Endurantism. David and
Clump do not currently share all the same temporal parts since they d
differ
iffer with
respect to their non-concrete
concrete parts. David is always composed of λ and µ,
µ which are
statue-shaped
shaped objects when concrete, and never has κ as a part, which is lumplump
shaped when concrete. Clump, on the other hand is always composed of all three.
David
id and Clump therefore always differ with respect to their parts since Clump
always has κ and David never does.

2.2 Against Worm Theory

Longenecker 7
But why should we prefer the LED Theory to Worm Theory? The reason is that there
are cases similar to the David and Clump case in which the objects do not differ with
respect to their spatial or even temporal parts. Consider the following case given by
Allan Gibbard:

the craftsman fashions the bottom half of a statue with one piece of clay and the top
half with another, he then fuses the top and bottom halves to create the statue
which he names ‘Davey’. Eventually he destroys Davey by slicing it in half. In this
case it is clear that not only does Davey the statue comes into ex
existence
istence at t2, but also
some new piece of clay. This is because when joining pieces of clay, a new piece
comes into existence. This piece of clay also goes out of existence at t3 since a piece
of clay can’t survive being cut into two (Gibbard 191). Call this
is piece of clay
‘Clumpy’. Clumpy and Davey share all the same temporal parts since they share the
same spatial parts and come into and out of existence at the same times. But Clumpy
and Davey also aren’t identical since Clumpy could survive all sorts of cchanges
hanges in
shape (such as being squashed into a ball) that Davey could not survive.
A tempting response to this problem for the Worm Theorist is to extend the
temporal parts idea to include modal parts as Takashi Yagisawa does (94).
(94)
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According to this idea, we shouldn’t think of objects as spread out just in space and
time, but also across possible worlds
worlds.

In this case, the worm in the actual world is not identical to either Davey or Clumpy,
but is just a modal part of each. In other worlds, there are othe
otherr worms that are also
parts of them. But they do not share all the same modal parts since there is a nonactual world in which there is a smushed lump of clay worm that is part of Clumpy
but not Davey, what I’m calling ‘‘ϕ’ in the diagram. But the obvious problem with this
response is that there are no objects that do not actually exist. Davey and Clumpy
cannot be ‘spread out across worlds’ in the sense that they have parts that do not
exist in the actual world.
So the modal parts response will not work fo
forr Worm Theorists. However, it
does show us how the LED Theory can be extended to address the problem. And
that is just to add objects that act like modal parts. More precisely, we should think
that there is an object that is actually part of Clump that wou
would
ld be a smushed lump
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of clay, were it concrete.. Though it is not actually ever concrete
concrete. This allows us to
avoid the claim that there are things that don’t actually exist, since these modal-like
modal
parts do actually exist, though they are not actually concrete.

In the illustration, we see that ϕ, χ and ψ exist in every possible world,
though each is only concrete at a single world. When ϕ is concrete, it is a lumpshaped object and when χ or ψ are concrete, they are statue-shaped. Davey not only
has χ and ψ as parts, but necessarily has them as parts. Likewise, Clumpy
necessarily has ϕ, χ and ψ as parts. On this view Davey and Clumpy don’t violate No
Complete Overlap since it’s not possible for them to share the same parts. For this
reason, the LED Theory
ory is superior to the competitors considered above. It alone can
preserve No Complete Overlap.
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